by Gerald D. “Jerry” Meyer – Nebraska National Guard Historian
At the Fort Donelson National Battlefield along the Cumberland River in Tennessee is a historical marker to the gallantry of the First Nebraska Infantry Regiment on Saturday, February 15, 1862. They were part of a Federal force that held the escape route of the Confederates inside of Donelson and denied them a chance to make a break to Nashville and continue to fight in the war. This battle would propel an unknown brigadier general from Illinois to eventual command of all Union forces and seven years later….president of the United States. This year marks the 158th anniversary of the North’s first major victory and the part that Nebraska played in the battle.
Two rivers point like knives into the heart of the Confederacy – the Tennessee and Cumberland. When Kentucky drops it’s neutrality at the start of the war, the leaders of the North see a way to strike deep into the Confederacy along these two water routes. The South rushes to build up fortifications along the routes at Forts Henry and Heiman along the Tennessee and Fort Donelson along the Cumberland. Whoever controls the Tennessee has the advantage of invasion as far south as Florence, Alabama and the control of the Cumberland is the gateway to Nashville.
On February 6, 1862, the North strikes at Forts Henry and Heiman. Fort Henry was on the waters’ edge and not the best place for defense of the river. Flag Officer Andrew Foote would command a group of ironclads (new to warfare at the time) and timber clads in an assault on Fort Henry. The land forces under General Grant would attack and secure Fort Heiman on the opposite side of the river (it was located on a dominate hill overlooking the river and Fort Henry). The navy hammered Fort Henry for two hours at close range before the Confederates surrendered. The land forces raced to the top of the hill and found that Fort Heiman had been evacuated a few hours earlier (some of the meals were still being cooked when the Federals arrived). The land forces crossed the river to cut off the retreating Confederates but missed an opportunity as they headed the 12 miles to Fort Donelson. Weather (rain) and mud on the roads made the task of moving on Donelson difficult. General Grant after the surrender of Fort Henry notified his superiors that he would move and capture Donelson on Feb. 8th. Soon after Henry fell, the navy sent its timber clads racing up the Tennessee into the heart of the Confederacy on a raid to destroy bridges, rail lines, capture supplies and destroy shipping. The ships made it to Florence, Alabama, over 150 miles from Henry and caused panic throughout the South. It would take six days for the Federal land forces to move (due to muddy roads and ships being repaired) from Fort Henry and get to the outer defensive line (12 miles away) of Donelson. The delay would set up an epic battle to control the Cumberland River.
The Union forces on Wednesday, February 12th marched the twelve miles from Henry to Donelson and were able to set up positions near the outer defensive belt around the fort. They were harassed by Tennessee cavalry under the brilliant leadership of Nathan Bedford Forrest (who would become one of the most feared warriors in the Confederate Army). The day they marched was sunny and warm. The troops traveled light for the march. Most kept their blanket and overcoat but some stored them with the logistics trains in the rear. This would prove a fatal mistake as the weather was about to turn cold and snowy. The Union navy showed up at noon to do a “show of force” by launching rounds into the water batteries overlooking the Cumberland River. The one ironclad, USS Carondelet, made the show while keeping its distance from the guns of Donelson. The forces were starting to come into position for a major battle.
After midnight on Thursday, February 13th the weather played its hand with snow, sleet and cold temperatures (12 degrees). Soldiers along the lines were not permitted to light fires (too close to sharpshooters and cannons) which made the night miserable (for both sides). General Grant was in no hurry to attack the Confederate positions as he waited for Flag Officer Foote to bring up a robust naval armada to subdue the fort (just like Fort Henry on Feb. 6th). The navy was delayed due to the slow speed of the ironclads and the troop transports coming up the Cumberland River. The second day at Donelson would see many skirmishes along the line (land) and a duel between the shore batteries and the Carondelet (water). The most spectacular was the water battle which commenced around 10am. The Carondelet came around the bend in the river at about a mile and half distance to the fort and opened fire. The Confederates opened fire with the long range rifled guns and scored many hits on the ironclad. Over the next hour, the ironclad would fire 139 shells (from the forward three guns on the ship) at Donelson. The ironclad would endure over 184 rounds which only one did significant damage to the ship. The land forces did a reconnaissance in force on the Confederate right flank. The attack was repulsed violently by the Confederates who were behind significant defensive positions of fallen trees and dirt supported by cannon. The obvious result of the Federal attacks was that the Confederate positions were substantial and this was not going to be another Fort Henry.
Valentine’s Day, Friday, February 14, 1862, was cold and the ground was covered in snow. The Confederate leadership of the fort met to decide the action for the coming battle. The consensus was a break to push open a hole in the Federal lines and make a run for Nashville. The First Nebraska arrived by naval transport and was moved into the line as part of Lew Wallace’s Division between Generals Smith and McClernand (ironically the spot the Confederates would gun for on Feb. 15th). The big show for this day was the naval battle to commence at 3pm. Flag Officer Foote would deploy his armada along the same game-plan that worked at Fort Henry. The ironclads would lead (with the front guns and heavy armor) doing most of the direct fighting. The timber clads would stay out of Donelson range and throw shells down into the fort. The fleet moved to within a quarter of a mile of the fort as it fired. At that close range, the Confederate gunners using the thirty-two pounders opened up and devastated the ironclads (including the wounding of Flag Officer Foote….ironically in the foot). The fleet floated back down the river to safety out of the range of the Confederate guns. The battle for the fort would have to be won on the ground with infantry and artillery.
Saturday, February 15th saw General Grant going down river to check on the injured Foote and the status of the navy forces. At dawn the Confederates made their break to escape the fort. They attacked at dawn along the line of General McClernand near the city of Dover. As they pushed the forces back along the Wynn Ferry Road, the stragglers ran into the division front of General Lew Wallace. His forces were aligned across the road with the Third Brigade (led by Nebraskan Colonel John Thayer): 58th Ohio and 32nd Illinois Company A on the left of the road, Illinois artillery on the road, 1st Nebraska and 58th Illinois on the right of the road, just behind the artillery in the center was the 76th Ohio, and behind them was the 46th and 57th Illinois. At noon, as the stragglers came through the line to secure ammo and form another line, the Confederates were right behind them in a massive wave headed towards the Nebraskans along Wynn Ferry Road and it looked like they would break out of the line and head to Nashville. The road network funneled the attackers along the road right into the sights of the Nebraskans. The Confederate tip of the spear was Brown’s 3rd Brigade (Colonel John C. Brown) and his Tennessee regiments (3rd, 18th, and 32nd). General Wallace ordered Thayer’s 3rdBrigade to fire and they did with Cornhusker, Buckeye and Illini soldiers pouring the lead into the oncoming butternut-clad Confederates. It was described as a text book defensive stand with rising and falling to fire and load as if on a parade field. The Confederates concentrated the fire on the Nebraskans and the Illinois artillery on the road. Three times the Confederates would attack in marching columns of “files of four” at the critical spot on the road. The Confederate cavalry, under Forrest, showed up only to be repulsed (and Forrest had his horse shot out from under him and had to fight on foot). The battle on Wynn Ferry Road would last until 1:30pm and the Rebel advance was stalled and they were ordered back to the defensive positions. General Smith on the Union left would launch an assault on the defensive positions (weaker because of the forces used in the breakout attempt). The 2nd Iowa would assault with fixed bayonets and take the northern defensive position overlooking the fort. The holding of the Wynn Ferry Road allowed the Federals to push back along the line to re-take all the lost ground of the day. The stage was set for the final battle on Sunday.
On Sunday, February 16ththe Union was set to launch a dawn attack to take the fort. The Confederate leadership overnight was in disarray about the way ahead and it finally settled on surrender. The forces that didn’t agree surrender were left to find a way out and make to the Confederate lines in the South. The white flag was raised at dawn over the fort and emissaries were sent forward to begin the armistice period and settling on the surrender terms. General Grant asked his aide what terms he should propose and the response was “no terms to the damned rebels”. The Confederate general inside the fort was Simon Bolivar Buckner, a friend of Grant from his days in California (he loaned Grant money), who expected his friendship to weigh in on the surrender terms. Grant’s response to Buckner was “no terms but unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted”. The response from Buckner was “to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose”. The day would see over 12,000 Confederates stack arms and surrender and be moved north by water transports to prisoner of war camps. Around the North, church bells would peel the word of the surrender of Fort Donelson. General Grant would become “Unconditional Surrender” Grant and a hero in the newspapers. He would have an admirer in the White House in President Lincoln who would say “I can’t spare this man….he fights”. An anonymous quote from one of his soldiers was “Ulysses don’t scare worth a damn”. The legend of General Grant would get its start at Fort Donelson in large part to the Nebraskans along Wynn Ferry Road that kept the Confederates from escaping and eventually surrendering on Sunday, February 16, 1862.
Gerald D. “Jerry” Meyer is the current Nebraska National Guard historian at the Nebraska National Guard Museum in Seward. To learn more about the museum and the role Nebraskans played in our military visit nengm.org